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DDAS Accident Report
Accident details
Report date: 19/04/2006

Accident number: 87

Accident time: not recorded

Accident Date: 24/06/1997

Where it occurred: Chawni Village,
Alikhail District, Paktia
Province
Primary cause: Field control
inadequacy (?)

Country: Afghanistan

Secondary cause: Inadequate equipment
(?)

Class: Detection accident

Date of main report: [No date recorded]

ID original source: none

Name of source: MAPA/UNOCHA

Organisation: [Name removed]
Mine/device: POMZ AP frag

Ground condition: bushes/scrub
grass/grazing area

Date record created: 24/01/2004

Date last modified: 24/01/2004

No of victims: 1

No of documents: 1

Map details
Longitude:

Latitude:

Alt. coord. system:

Coordinates fixed by:

Map east:

Map north:

Map scale: not recorded

Map series:

Map edition:

Map sheet:

Map name:

Accident Notes
inadequate metal-detector (?)
partner's failure to "control" (?)
inadequate investigation (?)
pressure to work quickly (?)

Accident report
At the time of the accident the UN MAC in Afghanistan favoured the use of two-man teams
(usually operating a one-man drill). The two would take it in turns for one to work on
vegetation cutting, detecting and excavation, while the other both rested and supposedly
"controlled" his partner.
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An investigation on behalf of the UN MAC was carried out and its report made briefly
available. The following summarises its content.
The victim's experience was not recorded. It was one month since his last revision course and
56 days since his last leave. The ground where the accident occurred was described as
grazing land that was "bushy with many trees". A photograph showed no trees and small
bushes with leaves. The demining group claimed to have "found fragments" identifying the
device as a POMZ.
The investigators determined that the victim was in a known POMZ minefield but neglected to
use a tripwire feeler before advancing beneath a big bush with the detector, so pulled a
tripwire with the detector head. It was recorded that there was "No damage to equipment", but
photographs of a damaged Schiebel detector were included in the report.
The Sub-Commander said that the victim had used a tripwire feeler but the "heavy bushes
and grass" stopped him finding the tripwire. He said the victim was careless to pull the wire
with his detector head. He said that better enforcement of existing procedure would prevent
repetition of such accidents.
The Section Leader stated that the deminer was working properly but was careless to pull
the tripwire with the detector head. He said such accidents could be avoided if deminers were
not pushed to clear quickly, if the mission length was reduced from 60 to 45 days, and if
supervisors helped deminers more.
The victim's partner said that he was working properly but made a mistake when pulling the
tripwire with the detector head.

Conclusion
The investigators concluded that the victim was negligent and did not use a tripwire feeler.

Recommendations
The investigators recommended that all Team Leaders and Section Leaders should ensure
that deminers use tripwire feelers properly and that the site operations officer controlling the
entire project must be warned for his poor performance – because other examples of the
same failure to use tripwire feelers had occurred in the same command group.

Victim Report
Victim number: 118

Name: [Name removed]
Gender: Male

Age:
Status: deminer

Fit for work: presumed

Compensation: 33,214 Rs

Time to hospital: not recorded

Protection issued: Helmet

Protection used: not recorded

Thin, short visor
Summary of injuries:
INJURIES
minor Arms
minor Chest
minor Face
minor Hand
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minor Legs
severe Hand
COMMENT
See medical report.

Medical report
The victim's injuries were summarised as: "simple" injuries to forehead and chin, "superficial"
injuries right chest and third finger left hand, minor injuries to both thighs and both legs.
A sketch showed multiple small abrasions to both legs, the neck, the forehead and a single
abrasion on the chest.
The demining group reported that the victim had suffered "simple injuries" to forehead, chin,
right chest wall, both thighs/legs and third finger of left hand.
A disability claim was submitted on 24th June 1997 in which his injuries were listed as:
multiple injuries on face, chest wall, both arms and hands and both eyes. His permanent
injury was only "mild stiffness of left hand" where 2nd metacarpal bone was fractured – which
was assessed as a 15% disability.
Compensation of 33,214 Rs was forwarded on 11th December 1997, representing a 6.3%
disability.

Analysis
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a "Field control inadequacy" because the victim
was working improperly and his error went uncorrected.
The failure of the detector to signal on tripwires is mentioned in other Afghan accidents, and is
presumed in this.
The failure to provide adequate tools must be seen as a management failing. The secondary
cause is listed as “Inadequate equipment”.
It is presumed that the victim recovered enough to undertake some form of work because his
compensation payment was very small.
The agency that was used to make investigations for the UN MAC (based in Pakistan) at this
time was frequently constrained by lack of funds, staff and transport. At times their movement
was constrained by safety concerns. As a result, investigations were frequently delayed by
weeks, meaning that an assessment of the site at the time of the accident was impossible.
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